

1. The four Ukrainians parachuted into the USSR on the night of 19-20 May 1951, carried with them well over 500 pounds of personal and communications equipment. On his person each man wore or carried:

- a. a complete hand-tailored partisan-type uniform including boots, britches, Sam Brown belt, etc.
- b. parachute harness and assembly
- c. 2 wristwatches
- d. 1 square flashlight taped to the chest strap on the Sam Brown belt
- e. 1 American M-2 caliber carbine in a leg jump holster with a 15-round magazine in the weapon plus 2 30-round magazines in the pockets of the holster which were worn on the right side secured to the belt and upper leg
- f. 1 packet of red pepper for throwing dogs off the scent
- g. 1 spring-blade jack knife carried in the upper left breast pocket
- h. bird call whistle for assembling, carried in upper left breast pocket
- i. 1 lethal pill which was inserted into the under side of the shirt collar in a slit covered by a small piece of transparent scotch tape so that the pills can be utilized without removing from the collar
- j. 1 fragmentation hand grenade in a cloth bag, taped to the inside of the left leg below the knee
- k. 1 set winter underwear
- l. 1 9mm Belgian pistol in holster on left side of belt plus 2 15-round magazines
- m. 1 automatic lead pencil
- n. 1 Zippo-type cigarette lighter
- o. 1 specially designed waterproofed money belt for code books, documents, etc., worn under the shirt
- p. 1 "parachutist kit bag model 1950" connected to the parachute assembly at the reserve chute rings on the chest in such a manner that after the canopy opens the parachutist can trip the two quick release snaps on his chest thus allowing the bag to fall twenty-two feet and dangle below the parachutist on the lowering strap

2. Each man carried in his kit bag:

- a. a German poncho
- b. a German compass
- c. German toilet articles
- d. 2 German handkerchiefs
- e. 1 German civilian shirt
- f. a first aid kit
- g. German chocolate bars

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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- h. 2 small hard salamis
- i. 2 small cans U. S. Army cheese ration
- j. several packets of U. S. Army biscuits
- k. 4 loaded M-2 carbine 30-round cartridge magazines
- l. 100 rounds carbine ammunition in two taped cardboard boxes

3. Since the additional contents of the kit bags varied they are listed below separately.

The eldest man of the group carried two rucksacks in his kit bag the first of which contained in addition to items listed in Para. 2:

- a. 1 hip flask of brandy (German manufacture)
- b. 1 set underwear (German manufacture)
- c. 1 writing pad
- d. 10 packs of cigarettes
- e. 2 strips of flannel to be worn instead of socks inside the boots

The second rucksack of the eldest man of the group contained a complete radio response beacon for aircraft for air reception purposes. The total kit bag load of this first man came to 76 pounds.


4. The second man's kit bag also contained two rucksacks and weighed a total of 92 pounds. The first rucksack contained in addition to items listed in Para. 2:

- a. German field glasses
- b. maps and a map case
- c. a hip flask of weapons' lubricant
- d. 1 German automatic pencil
- e. 1 German writing pad
- f. 10 packs of cigarettes

The second piece of the second man's kit bag is a tailor made rucksack which contained:

- a. 2 spare part kits for W/T sets
- b. 4 radio batteries in waterproof containers
- c. 1 set hand generator legs

5. The third man's kit bag contained three rucksacks and weighed 97 pounds. The contents of the first rucksack were in addition to those listed in Para 2:

- a. 1 hip flask of brandy
 - b. 1 set German underwear
 - c. 1 pair German socks
 - d. 2 strips German flannel for foot wear
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- e. maps and map case
- f. 50 rounds 9mm pistol ammunition taped in two boxes
- g. 1 generator adapter unit
- h. 1 set radio head phones

The second rucksack of the third man contained one hand generator complete except for legs.

The third man's third rucksack contained:

- a. 1 radio receiver unit
- b. 1 radio transmitter unit

6. The fourth man's total kit bag load was a duplicate of the third man's and weighed 97 pounds. Both the third and the fourth man were the better radio operators and each carried equipment for sending and receiving via W/T.

7. An aerial delivery container was dropped to the team after it had arrived on the ground and signaled by flashlight its position. All radio equipment in this bundle was wrapped for burial. The total load of the bundle was 205 pounds. The cargo parachute had a 500 pound load capacity. The contents of the bundle were as follows:

- a. 8 radio batteries
- b. 2 bottles of electrolyte acid for the battery of the response beacon
- c. 1 radio transmitter
- d. 1 radio receiver
- e. 2 spare part kits
- f. 1 radio power pack unit
- g. 1 hand generator
- h. 1 spare dry battery for the response beacon
- i. 1 set of modified generator legs
- j. 1600 rounds of carbine ammunition packed in cans
- k. 1 M-2 fully-automatic carbine and holster

8. Prior to the flight, the Ukrainian jump master and the pilots were briefed together so that in an emergency the jump master could inform the jumpers of their approximate location before they bailed out. Three Thermite incendiary grenades were carried to destroy the aircraft in case it was forced down in enemy territory. Spare parachutes were carried in the aircraft to replace any that were accidentally or prematurely opened.

9. On the Czech-USSR border the pilots noted that red flares were ignited about two kilometers to the right of the aircraft's course. Flares both red and greenish-white were also observed three kilometers to the left of the aircraft. On the return trip approximately fifteen flares were seen to the right of the aircraft and only two or three on the left. Otherwise no ground activity was noted which could possibly have had any connection with the flight.

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10. The drop zone around the evacuated town of Saerokle Pole (GSGS-4416 Sheet V-18, Coordinates B-46) was identified and observed in detail by the pilots at too close range to permit the jumpers to leave the aircraft on the first pass over the field. On the second pass the prearranged light signal from the reception party was observed by the co-pilot. When the bail out signal was given all four men jumped without hesitation. The plane circled again and dropped the freight package right of the reception party's light signal which was observed both by the pilots and the jump master.

11. W/T contact with the team was established less than twenty-four hours after their arrival. The first message reported the safe landing of all members of the team and their equipment and concluded with a sign off for "several days."

12. Nothing further was heard via W/T from the team until 19 June when the team indicated successful contact with Major P. POLTAVA of the UNVR. The message from POLTAVA requested political support. That message was answered by us with a promise for full logistical assistance conditioned on their ability to receive supplies securely. Political support consistent with U. S. policy of self-determination was also mentioned. In two subsequent messages from the Ukraine the team said that powerful enemy operations clearly intended to destroy the Ukrainian resistance organization had hampered W/T contact between 20 May and 19 June. The general tenor of the messages leads us to consider it entirely possible that as a result of the intense enemy pressure there is little contact between the various small units of the underground, no offensive activity and less actual contact with the civilian population than in any year in the last decade. We therefore consider the first major task to be that of bolstering our precarious radio link by dispatching more W/T operators and sets plus the food and other supplies needed by the personnel of the W/T station and POLTAVA's headquarters for the fall and winter of 1951-52.

13. We have already enumerated in our cable transmitted around 20 July all additional salient items in the W/T traffic to date. By previous agreement we have been sending "blind" a few messages on purely operational matters. We expect our team to receipt for these messages in the near future and to transmit whatever traffic they have accumulated over the last two weeks.

14. More detailed information on the equipping of the various British teams and a summary of the W/T traffic would be highly appreciated.

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